We derive a formal, decision-based method for comparing the performance of counterfactual treatment regime predictions using the results of experiments that give relevant information on the distribution of treated outcomes. Our approach allows us to quantify and assess the statistical significance of differential performance for optimal treatment regimes estimated from structural models, extrapolated treatment effects, expert opinion, and other methods. We apply our method to evaluate optimal treatment regimes for conditional cash transfer programs across countries where predictions are generated using data from experimental evaluations in other countries and preprogram data in the country of interest. * We are grateful to
Introduction
Social scientists often provide recommendations about the implementation of policies, which determine whether and in what manner a given treatment should be applied in some target context. Crucial to this task is generating counterfactual predictions that to informs such recommendations. The methods to which social scientists turn to for this purpose are varied. They include quantitative extrapolations from existing randomized evaluations or observational studies, predictions based on structural models that interpret behavioral patterns in the target context, and more subjective expert opinions, among others. Our goal in this paper is to offer a formal framework for evaluating the relative success of methods for generating policy recommendations. We evaluate the success of ex ante policy recommendations that can draw on pre-existing experiments and descriptive data to recommend a treatment assignment in a target context. Then, we conduct an ex post evaluation of the recommendation, based on information from experiments in the target context. We are thus able to quantify and assess the statistical significance, ex post, of the differential performance of various methods for generating ex ante recommendations. These ex post assessments can inform choices over methods to produce ex ante recommendations for new contexts where experimental data are not yet available.
Our framework is decision-based, considering optimal choices for a social planner seeking to maximize a welfare objective under constraints. In the full development of our framework, we consider a linear social welfare function, although the framework could take into consideration preferences over inequality, uncertainty, status quo bias, or other modifications. The planner is thought to face constraints that limit the set of policy options. For example, the planner may face a budget constraint that limits the number and scale of treatments that can be administered. Multiple methods may yield identical results for basic types of recommendations -e.g., they may agree on whether the treatment is harmful or helpful on average, in which case they would make the same recommendation regarding the alternatives of "treat everyone" versus "treat no one." But when it comes to estimating optimal policies, methods may differ in their recommendations. Such differences in recommendations would be due to different methods' predictions about how different types of people respond to treatment (Manski, 2004; Dehejia, 2005; Hirano and Porter, 2009; Imai and Strauss, 2011; Kitagawa and Tetenov, 2017; Athey and Wager, 2017) . The wider the range of admissible policy options, the wider is the scope for methods to differ in their recommendations and thus in their relative performance. Another way to put this is that the more refined the policy decision at stake, the more we need to ask of the methods, and thus the more refined will be our judgment about the performance of different methods.
What we refer to as a "method" is an approach for determining which of these policy options should be implemented. These include reduced form methods that rely on conditional unconfoundedness to extrapolate conditional treatment effects using existing experimental or observational evaluations from other contexts, as in Hotz et al. (2005) and Dehejia et al. (2017) . Another class of methods includes meta-analytical methods that model heterogeneity across contexts, as in Dehejia (2003) , Meager (2016), and Vivalt (2016) . A third class of methods includes structural models. These include models that interpret behavioral patterns among untreated observations within the target context so as to generate counterfactual predictions about outcomes under treatment, as in Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Todd and Wolpin (2008) . They also include approaches that estimate of some structural model parameters using untreated units in the target context and others from available experimental evidence, as in Attanasio et al. (2012) . Hybrids of reduced form and structural methods are also available, as in Gechter (2016) . Finally, a fifth class of methods includes the solicitation of subjective opinions of experts, as discussed in Banerjee et al. (2016) and applied in DellaVigna and Pope (2017) . Counterfactual prediction methods may need to address biases that arise from non-random selection of contexts for producing evidence (Allcott, 2015) . In our application, we allow methods to draw on existing experimental data from other contexts as well as data on covariates and untreated outcomes in the target context. The resulting recommendations are thus "ex ante" insofar as they are made under uncertainty about the distribution of potential outcomes under treatment. An assessment is then done ex post, using data from experiments that reveal the distribution of potential outcomes under treatment. Our analysis allows us to determine, ex post, whether the policy recommendation from one or another method performed significantly better in terms of promoting welfare.
We use our framework to evaluate conditional cash transfer policies for increasing children's school enrollment, a policy subject to widespread consideration around the world (Parker and Vogl, 2018) . We begin with an illustrative example of making a policy recommendation for a conditional cash transfer program in Morocco. Ex ante, the methods can draw upon data from a conditional cash transfer experiment in Mexico-specifically, the PROGRESA randomized evaluation-as well as covariates and untreated outcome data in Morocco. We consider two types of methods: (1) reduced form extrapolation of conditional treatment effects from Mexico to Morocco and (2) a non-parametric structural model that uses data from untreated households within Morocco. We then assess, ex post, the performance of the two methods using the results of the randomized evaluation conducted by Benhassine et al. (2015) . The results show that the reduced form extrapolation outperforms the non-parametric structural approach in this particular case. Our findings speak to the question of whether policy recommendations should rely on internally valid evidence generated outside the target context, or whether one should rely on potentially confounded evidence from within the target context, as in Pritchett and Sandefur (2013) .
Our methodological contribution is a formal framework for evaluating policy recommendations based on counterfactual predictions from competing methods. Our aim is to provide tools that are more general in speaking to policy recommendations than the relatively informal and case-specific model validation exercises that regularly appear in the applied microeconomics literature; see, for example, Todd and Wolpin (2006) , Keane and Wolpin (2007) , Duflo et al. (2012) , and Wolpin (2013) , who each use predictions into holdout samples to evaluate the fit of structural models. Our framework for evaluating policy recommendation methods builds on Pesaran and Skouras (2002) and Granger and Machina (2006) 's notion of using information on the intended use of predictions as a basis for judging methods, foundational work on forecast evaluation theory by Diebold and Mariano (1995) , White (2000) , and Hansen et al. (2011) , as well as work on prediction-based model comparisons by Keane and Wolpin (2007) , Wolpin (2007) , Wolpin (2013) , Schorfheide and Wolpin (2012) , and Schorfheide and Wolpin (2016) . We see our work as complementary to research by DellaVigna and Pope (2017) on evaluating the quality of experts' ex ante forecasts by using experimental data ex post. Manski (1996 Manski ( , 2004 , Dehejia (2005) , Porter (2009), Tetenov (2012) , Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017) , and Athey and Wager (2017) address the issue of deriving optimal treatment regimes in decision-theoretic terms in sample; we extend these ideas to the evaluation of methods out of sample as well. Finally, our application to the conditional cash transfer programs draws on the synthesis discussions in Banerjee et al. (2017) and Garcia and Saavedra (2017) as well as the specific data and analyses conducted by De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006), Todd and Wolpin (2006) , and Attanasio et al. (2012) for Mexico and Benhassine et al. (2015) for Morocco.
Setting
Let M define a set of methods under consideration. A method m ∈ M produces predictions for a set of real-valued treatment conditions, T , finite. Suppose that the status quo treatment condition is given by t = 0 ∈ T for all m ∈ M. Considering our application below, we can imagine that m could be a reduced form extrapolation method for predicting responses to different subsidy schedules, which are elements in the set T , including the no subsidy condition, t = 0.
Suppose we have C contexts, indexed by c ∈ {1, ..., C}. We consider a social planner interested in using data from the C contexts to devise welfare-maximizing policies in a set of target contexts. Let D c be an indicator variable dividing the contexts into target and reference contexts, such that D c = 1 when c is a target context and D c = 0 when c is a reference context. The planner wants to assess the methods in M according to their ability to assign individuals to treatments from within T in a way that maximizes the planner's social welfare function in the target contexts, subject to potential constraints on feasible treatments. A set of treatment conditions, T c ⊆ T , is active in each context c, although methods may be able to use data from a set T c to generate counterfactual predictions for treatments that are outside this set. For example, structural methods can generate counterfactual predictions for treatment effects with treatments that have never been implemented. For the target contexts, we suppose that ex ante, T c = {0}, meaning only data on the status quo conditions are available. In the reference contexts, ex ante, T c may contain treatments other than just the status quo. Thus, in the target contexts, only the t = 0 treatment is active prior to the implementation of policy, and the social planner is seeking a recommendation on how to introduce treatments from a feasible set of options in T so as to maximize welfare, given the constraints. The recommendations are based on methods that make counterfactual predictions for the target contexts. We observe an J- Within a given context c, let i index individuals. Each context is governed by a probability distribution, P c , on the following: an individual-level treatment variable, T ic , where
and an individual-level potential outcome function, Y P ic : T c → R, that maps treatments to outcomes. These outcomes measure individual wellbeing from the planner's perspective. We suppose the following conditions on the outcome data:
Let Y it = Y P ic (T ic ) be the observed outcome for unit i in context c. The observed data consist of the context level characteristics and individual-level data,
for random samples of individuals i ∈ {1, ..., n c } across contexts c = {1, ..., C}.
For simplicity, we focus on the case where we can take individual-level treatments to be binary, in which case T = {0, 1}, where t = 0 is a status quo control condition and t = 1 a treated condition. In reality, treatments are never implemented identically, and so t = 1 may represent different treatments in each context. The point is that methods will use treated conditions from reference contexts to generate a counterfactual prediction for the target context. Then, individuals' potential outcomes are Y P ic (1), Y P ic (0) and observed outcomes are given by
. For a context c ∈ {1, .., C}, consider the following conditions on the data generating process defining P c :
C3. stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA; Rubin, 1980) , such that for T ic = t, Y ic = Y P ic (t) with probability 1.
When conditions C1-C3 hold, the conditional (on covariates) potential outcome distributions for both the treatment and control groups in the reference contexts are identified.
In our setting, we suppose that, ex ante, we are working with a random sample for which conditions C1-C3 hold in the reference contexts (for which D ic = 0). However, in the the target contexts (for which D c = 1), we suppose that, ex ante, we have a random sample only for units with T ic = 0, while the covariate distributions are also identified. As
The methods make use of these distributions to derive policy recommendations. Once the recommendations are submitted, we then suppose that the conditions C1-C3 obtain in the target contexts, in which case the
This allows the planner to judge, ex post, the quality of the methods in terms of how their recommendations fair with respect to welfare. Note that our specification of the potential outcomes, combined with assump-tion C3, rules out "interference," including general equilibrium effects (Cox, 1958, p. 19; Aronow and Samii, 2017) .
Planner's Objective and Ex Ante Recommendations
We can define the planner's objective in context c in general terms as
where π c : V × W → {0, 1} is a treatment assignment policy function that takes in covariate values, conditional on contextual attributes V c , and maps them to either treatment or control.
Then, P c (π c ) is the joint potential outcome-covariate distribution induced by π c . The set Π c represents admissible treatment assignment rules determined by the planner, perhaps based on budgetary or feasibility constraints. The restriction to the range {0, 1} follows from our focus on binary treatments. If a richer set of treatment values T were under consideration, the range of π c (·) could be defined as a distribution function over this T . Sometimes the set of conditional treatment assignments that maximizes this objective ex ante is non-uniquei.e., there are ties. For example, multiple units may share the same covariate value. The treatment assignment that maximizes the objective, given the constraint, may assign some fraction of such units to treatment. Then, all permutations of assignments would yield the same ex ante value for the objective. We assume that π c encodes a tie-breaker rule that is unconditionally statistically independent and equalizes probability of treatment for such tied units.
In this general specification of the objective function, U(·) is an arbitrary functional on the distribution induced by π c . This allows the planner to take into consideration arbitrary features of the potential outcome distributions and, possibly, distributions of potential outcomes conditional on covariates. This admits possibilities such as inequality aversion or preferences with respect to uncertainty (Dehejia, 2008) , as well as asymmetry in preferences toward different treatments, such as status quo bias (Tetenov, 2012) . One could also differentially handle outcomes for different groups in society (e.g., households depending on whether they have children). See also Manski (2004) and Hirano and Porter (2009) for specifications that encode different social welfare objectives.
Current approaches to this problem (as in Manski, 2004 , Tetenov, 2012 consider social welfare that is linear in expected treatment and control outcomes. We begin with such an approach. We suppose that we are operating in context c, and therefore suppress the associated indexing except when necessary for clarification. Thus, we can define
where
The policy function, π : V × W → [0, 1], maps individuals' covariates, conditional on context level attributes, to a treatment assignment probability. As such, the objective becomes,
In our setting, we have data to estimate the status quo control mean µ 0 directly. Then, a method m generates a point estimateτ m to use in recommending an assignment function π m that solves the planner's problem. Under linear social welfare, this implies
Then, ex post welfare associated with m's recommendation is
A method could make a recommendation to account for risk aversion on the part of the planner due to uncertainty about conditional treatment effects. A method m may thus yield not only point predictions but also distribution predictions for conditional treatment effects,
. Suppose a continuous function, u(·), that capture the planner's risk preferences.
Then, a method m could account for risk aversion ex ante by making a recommendation as
Ex post welfare would be given by
where the second equality is due to π u m (·) ∈ {0, 1} and the statistically independent tiebreaker rule.
Ex Post Inference
Ex post, we obtain a random sample of experimental units in the target context for which conditions C1-C3 hold. We assume that in this ex post experiment, treatment assignment probabilities are given by p(W i ), and that these probabilities are known. We use this sample to check the welfare implications of the recommendations from different methods. A linear welfare contrast for two models, l and m, is given by The experimental data in our target context allow us to estimate this welfare contrast.
Given a random sample of size N in the target context, we consider an estimator for the linear welfare contrast based on inverse-probability of treatment weighting with normalized weights. This estimator is efficient among consistent estimators that avoid modeling of either the potential outcome surfaces or conditional treatment probabilities (Hirano et al., 2003; Lunceford and Davidian, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, 35) . We define the estimator
Inference for this estimator is based on the random sampling of (Y i , T i , W i ) values from P under conditions C0-C3.
With risk aversion, the welfare contrast is
Analogous to the estimator for the linear welfare contrast, an efficient estimator for the welfare contrast under risk aversion iŝ
Then, inference for∆ u lm is also analogous, simply substituting in the outcomes transformed by u(·).
We can consider a family of functionals,
for g : R → R continuous, where ∆ lm is given by defining g(·) as the identity function and ∆ u lm is given by defining g(y) = u(y) for all y ∈ R. Definê
Then we have the following:
Proposition 1. Under conditions C1-C3 and supposing |E [g(Y
, and
All proofs are contained in the appendix. Conditional on W i = w, the recommendations, π m (w) and π l (w), are fixed. Our uncertainty about the welfare contrast is due to sampling and treatment assignment variation in the data gathered in the target context that we use for the ex post assessment.
1
Proposition 1 is sufficient to perform inference for any pair of methods. Hansen et al. (2011) provide a sequential multiple testing algorithm for establishing a "model confidence set" (MCS) of level 1 − α, which allows one to distinguish a set of best performing algorithms with an asymptotic error rate of α.
MCS implementation is relatively straightforward. The iterative procedure is as follows.
1. For all l, m ∈ M form the pairwise t-statistics
. Test the null hypothesis of equal welfare for all methods in M using the test statistic
Note that the distribution of T R,M under the null hypothesis (∆ g lm = 0 ∀ l, m ∈ M) is difficult to characterize analytically with many models. We use the bootstrap procedure proposed in Hansen et al. (2011) . If we fail to reject the null hypothesis at level 1 − α, our MCS is M and we stop.
3. Otherwise we form a new set of methods, M 1 , which omits the method with the worst studentized welfare contrast. I.e., l satisfying arg min
We then repeat steps 1 and 2 with M 1 in place of M.
1 Treating the treatment assignment rules as fixed is necessary to allow expert predictions to be elements of M. Diebold (2015) makes this point in reviewing Diebold and Mariano (1995) and the literature following it, drawing a distinction between Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) , which additionally considers uncertainty arising from the samples on which models are fitted to generate predictions.
4. Steps 1, 2, and 3 are repeated until arriving at an M s at which the null of equal welfare cannot be rejected at level 1 − α at which point M s is our MCS.
Empirical Illustration
For an empirical illustration, we use data from Mexico and Morocco on the effects of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) on primary school enrollment. We consider a policy scenario where a planner in Morocco is seeking recommendations under linear social welfare for implementing a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. We use data from randomized evaluations of the PROGRESA program in Mexico (Schultz, 2004; Behrman et al., 2005; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Attanasio et al., 2012) and the TAYSSIR program in Morocco (Benhassine et al., 2015) . To construct the ex ante evaluations, we are limited to using the full data from Mexico and then only the control group data from Morocco. The ex post assessment is done using the full experimental data from Morocco.
Our assessment compares the performance of two different methods. The first is reduced form extrapolation of conditional treatment effects, as per, e.g., Hotz et al. (2005) and Dehejia et al. (2016) . We use the Mexico data to estimate treatment effects conditional on gender and age, and then extrapolate those estimates to Morocco to determine how treatment should be allocated optimally by gender and age in Mexico. The second is a nonparametric structural approach due to Todd and Wolpin (2008) . This structural approach uses only the control group data within Morocco, modeling responsiveness to cash transfers to predict treatment effects by age and gender. This comparison allows us to assess whether theoretically-informed, local observational analysis might be preferable to more agnostic extrapolation of well-identified experimental effects from out of context. This particular issue is one that Pritchett and Sandefur (2013) raise in a discussion about potential trade-offs between internal and external validity.
To relate this application to our general analysis above, i indexes children, c country (Mexico or Morocco), and then the outcome Y ic refers to school enrollment for child i in context c. The covariate set W includes the set of gender-by-age strata for boys and girls between 10 to 16 years old. The policy space Π is restricted to allow for transfers that amount to 50 Moroccan dirhams (MAD) per child per month on average, averaging over both attendees and non-attendees, with transfers going to attendees being 100 MAD per month. This restriction on the policy space is arbitrary, but it forces the methods to make recommendations about who to include and who to exclude from treatment.
Our covariates are discretely distributed over 14 age-by-gender strata, and the restrictions on the policy space can be expressed as a budget constraint. Thus, we can express the solution to the linear welfare problem (2) as
subject to Table 1 displays the estimated shares for the ageby-gender strata. Given (ρ w ,τ m (w)), we solve for π m through linear programming.
Theτ m (w) values are estimated using our two methods. The first method is the reduced form approach that takes stratum-specific treatment effect estimates from the Mexico experiment. We estimate these stratum-specific treatment effects using Attanasio et al. (2012) 's difference-in-difference approach on the PROGRESA evaluation dataset. Specifically, Behrman and Todd (1999) and Attanasio et al. (2012) document differences in school enrollment rates among non-eligible households in treatment vs. control communities in the PROGRESA dataset. These differences make it appear as if the PROGRESA CCT had a significant impact on enrollment rates among households who could not receive payments for having their children go to school. Attanasio et al. (2012) therefore investigate pre-to-post program implementation changes in enrollment rates in treatment vs. control communities for eligible and ineligible households through a difference-in-differences specification and find no effect for ineligible households. We therefore follow their approach and report and use, for each stratum, the difference in the change in enrollment rates for eligible households in treated communities compared to control.
These conditional treatment effect estimates are given in Panel II of Table 1. The treatment effects show an inverted-U shape in age for both males and females.
As documented elsewhere in the literature on PROGRESA (see e.g. Figure 1 in De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006)), the larger effects for children in their early teen years appear to be a function of the age at which the transition to secondary school occurs. Encouraging children to continue to secondary school is a primary driver of the effect of PROGRESA on school enrollment. To the extent that the structure of the Moroccan education system differs from the Mexican, we may not expect these exact patterns to generalize to Morocco which would hurt the performance of an eligibility scheme based on PROGRESA but implemented in Morocco.
The second method uses a non-parametric structural model of school attendance proposed in Todd and Wolpin (2008) . We can use the one-child case to illustrate how the estimation works. Suppose that a household's utility maximization problem when choosing school enrollment y is given by max y U(c, y; w, ǫ) subject to c = n + e(1 − y), where c is consumption, n is household income excluding child earnings, e is the child's wage offer. w and ǫ are measured and unmeasured household characteristics which shift preferences for schooling, respectively. An optimal school attendance decision is given by, y * = φ(n, e; w, ǫ) = 1{U(n, 1; w, ǫ) > U(n + e, 0; w, ǫ)}.
Now, introducing a conditional subsidy s affects the budget constraint as, c = n + e(1 − y) + sy = (n + s) + (e − s)(1 − y), and so y * * = φ(n + s, e − s; w, ǫ). Defineñ = n + s andẽ = e − s, and let the distribution of ǫ be such that
which means that n and e are exogenous. Under this model, we can predict the effect of the subsidy for any child in our Moroccan control group by plugging her (ñ,ẽ) into the fit of a non-parametric regression of enrollment, y, on n, e, and w.
We follow Todd and Wolpin (2008) in using regional wages in industries employing most children to infer wage offers. Specifically, we measure a child's wage offer using the average wage of a worker in agriculture or ranching among households having at least one member in the child's school. Since the Moroccan control group consists of only 1193 children, in practice we do not include stratum dummies in the non-parametric regression. Different age-by-gender statrum-specific treatment effects, reported in Panel III of Table 1 , arise from differences in the average treated outcomes the procedure predicts for each subgroup. These results display roughly an order of magnitude more variability than those in Panel II. This may be an issue of selection, or of thin support for some common values of (ñ,ẽ).
We use each method's conditional treatment effect estimates to solve (4), yielding distinct π m recommendation vectors for m being either the Reduced Form Extrapolation or Nonparametric Structural method. These recommendations are displayed in Panels V and VI of Table 1 . Given the linear welfare objective, the recommendations amount to taking strata for which treatment effects are positive, then rank-ordering them in their magnitude, and then going down the ranks and setting π m (w) = 1 until one hits the budget constraint. We see that for the reduced form extrapolation, the budget is exhausted before all units in the female 10-year old cell can be treated, in which case the recommendation is to assign 37.2%
to treatment. For the non-parametric structural approach, only the strata for females 12 years of age or older have positive treatment effects. The budget allows for treatment of all children in these strata. In fact, the main difference between the two assignment schemes is that the non-parametric structural approach does not advocate hitting the budget constraint preferring, instead, to avoid the negative treatment effects it believes would result from treating younger children.
The ex post analysis takes in these recommendations and then uses estimated conditional average treatment effects for Morocco to estimate the welfare contrast for the two methods.
The estimates are given in panel IV of Table 1 . As in PROGRESA, treatment effects are small for younger children due to near-universality of enrollment at these ages. There are also spikes in the age-specific treatment effects, although they do not occur at exactly the same ages as in PROGRESA.
Estimating the welfare contrast yields an estimate suggesting that the PROGRESA-based extrapolation outperforms the non-parametric structural model by 0.029 percentage points of enrollment. The estimated standard error on the difference is 0.006 so the difference is highly statistically significant. We can compare this difference to the overall average treatment effect from the Morocco study, which is 0.085 (standard error = 0.011).
Conclusion
We develop a decision-based approach to comparing the relative performance of methods for generating counterfactual predictions that are then used to make policy recommendations. We consider a social planner who is operating in a target context and is seeking recommendations on what policy to choose from a set of feasible options. The richness of the space of policy options determines the nature of the recommendations being soughte.g., whether a simple up-or-down recommendation to treat everyone or no one, or a more refined recommendation about who should be treated and who not. Recommendations could be based on econometric estimates, whether reduced form or structural, or expert opinions.
Our leading application is one where the planner maximizes a linear welfare objective in assigning treatments on the basis of available covariate information. In this case, the success of a method for generating recommendations depends on how accurately it can predict conditional treatment effects in the target context. We also demonstrate how one can take into account considerations such as risk aversion by using estimated of conditional treatment effect distributions.
We define a welfare contrast to use for conducting an ex post analysis of how well different methods performed with respect to the planner's goals. We estimate this welfare contrast by using experimental data that reveals how a treatment affects the outcome distribution in the target population. The welfare contrast is straightforward to compute, and it allows us to judge whether one method outperforms another in a manner that is statistically significant.
We provide an empirical illustration that considers a planner seeking a recommendation on how to implement program using conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to boost school enroll- We then perform an ex post evaluation of these two methods using data from a randomized evaluation of CCTs in Morocco. In our application, reduced form extrapolation significantly outperforms the non-parametric structural approach primarily because the structural approach predicts negative treatment effects for several subgroups. We view this toy example as helping build intuition for which kinds of methods to evaluate in a full-featured empirical portion of the paper including the contexts from Banerjee et al. (2017) which we will pre-specify.
We see this exercise as making three contributions. First, as our application attempts to show, it provides a clear framework to assess internal validity versus external validity trade-offs. In particular, our application allows us to assess how robust and internally valid estimates from external contexts fare relative to within-context estimates that may be biased due to model misspecification (Pritchett and Sandefur, 2013) . Second, it provides a principled basis for assessing the performance of different methods by tying the assessment to welfare considerations. This is important, because different objective functions can imply different rank orderings of methods. Our approach thus forces one to first consider the welfare objective so as to be clear about the relevant objective. Third, we show that each experiment or observational study may contain much more decision-relevant information than would be contained in a single treatment effect estimate.
We are undertaking a number of extensions to what we have done here. The first is to consider a wider range of methods for generating conditional treatment effect estimates.
Regularized or machine learning tools may improve upon the non-and semi-parametric approaches used in the example above. Structural approaches that do more to combine external and internal data may also yield better predictions. Moreover, model selection or model averaging approaches based on our welfare criteria may lead to better predictions. We also plan to work with evidence bases that include more external contexts. In doing so, we would want to account for site selection, as per Allcott (2015) and Gechter and Meager (2018) .
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. By the weak law of large numbers, Slutsky's theorem, and conditions C2 and C3,∆ g lm has the same limit as
Take the first term on the right-hand side. By the weak law of large numbers, iterated expectations, and condition C1, (Newey and McFadden, 1994; Lunceford and Davidian, 2004) .
To see this, first note that∆ g lm =δ 1 −δ 0 for (δ 1 ,δ 0 ) that solve the score equations Then, given random sampling, bounded first and second moments, and conditions C1-C2,
, 
